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Assessing development and the idea  
of development in the 1950s in Brazil
RAfAel Rossotto ioRis 
Antonio Augusto Rossotto ioRis*
The decade of 1950s was a crucial period of the industrialization of the Brazil-
ian economy. The dominant school of thought was the national-developmentalism, 
which was not restricted to the sphere of economic production but also encom-
passed political and socio-cultural processes of change. Combining repression, 
persuasion and paternalism, the national state took a significantly political and 
economic responsibility in the social, material and symbolic modernization dur-
ing the Vargas and Kubitschek administrations. However, internal disputes, foreign 
demands and a long legacy of socio-spatial inequalities prevented the achievement 
of more socially inclusive goals, leading a legacy of unanswered questions that still 
have currency today.
Keywords: Brazil, national-developmentalism, Vargas, Kubitschek, technocratic 
planning.
JEL Classification: O14; O25; O54; L52.
intRoduction
At the dawn of the 1950s Brazil had a population of around fifty five million 
and an economy largely defined by the production and export of agricultural com-
modities. The decade witnessed nonetheless a profound transformation as distinct 
sectors of the Brazilian society engaged in implementing a substantial redefinition 
of the nation’s traditional agrarian basis. Along these lines, fast-paced growth by 
means of deepening the process of import substitution industrialization would 
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become a political priority for the most influential sectors of government officials 
and public intellectuals in the period. While in agreement insofar as the general goal 
of fast paced economic growth, these different social segments would put forward 
different views on what national development should mean and a rich debate per-
taining to the strategies of achieving such an objective would unfold. In the end, 
however, a national strategy centred on absolute rates of economic growth pre-
vailed, at the exclusion of more socially inclusive policies. 
The prevailing literature on the developmental decade of the 1950s in Brazil 
has posited that despite rising political disputes, the goal of fast-paced growth had 
produced a purported nation-wide ‘developmental consensus.’ Some of the most 
influential works advancing this position include Benevides (1976); Carone (985); 
Draibe (1985); Guimarães (2005); Ianni (1963, 1986); Lafer (2002); Martins 
(1968); Napoleão (1988); Oliveira (1991); Rodrigues (1994); Silva and Carneiro 
(1983); Skidmore (1967); and Weffort (1978). To be sure, the claim that 1950s in 
Brazil were marked by an upbeat patriotic sentiment disseminated among several 
upper and middle-income sectors seems indeed warranted and these historical dy-
namics were reflected in many events that helped shape the prevailing self-image 
of the nation constructed at the time. In 1958, for instance, Brazil would win the 
Soccer World Cup for the first time and the Bossa Nova music was introduced to 
world audiences. In tandem, governmental administrations were quick to cunning-
ly exploit the symbolism of the social and economic transformations taking place 
in the urban and rural landscape. Domestically produced automobiles began taking 
the streets and the growing numbers of highways interconnecting the country’s 
immense territory, and, as the decade came to an end, Brasília, Brazil’s new futur-
istic-looking administrative capital was inaugurated in the heartland of the country 
thus purportedly marking the nation’s dawn of a new era. 
These transformative events notwithstanding, the long legacy of underdevelop-
ment remained a vivid reality in the country as the majority of its citizens continued 
to be illiterate and to face dire living conditions on a daily basis. The industrial 
growth, urban regeneration and artistic creativity of the period would be all but 
restricted to a minority of the population, especially those living in the wealthier 
parts of the large cities in the Southeast Region. Furthermore, the alleged unity 
around national development that purportedly characterized the period would not 
be capable of disguising the intense process of class differentiation and uneven 
development that eventually culminated in the institutional rupture of the early 
1960s which heralded twenty-one long years of military dictatorship.
Combining a micro-level historical analysis with a critical theoretical frame of 
reference, the present article seeks to argue that despite the different view on nation 
development, state-led reforms taking place in the 1950s would ultimately lead to 
the implementation of very selective, resilient, and ultimately regressive economic 
policies with long-lasting consequences for the country. Specifically in the second 
half of the decade promoted a close linkage established between national and for-
eign capital under the aegis of the national developmental state, at the expense of 
a — much expected among trade unions and critical intellectuals — more socially 
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inclusive path of national development. As will be shown below, despite the clear 
existence of alternative positions that could lead to a more autonomous and far-
reaching agenda, the federal Brazilian administration would pursue a conservative, 
and ultimately exclusionary, course of industrial promotion and economic growth. 
These partial transformations took place under a vibrant, but superficial, discourse 
of modernization and national harmony, which paradoxically fostered social and 
institutional contradictions that would influence the national politics and the econ-
omy of Brazil for the next half century. 
The article is organized into four distinct sections. The first presents the main 
lines of the conceptual framework set forth to examine the complex relationships 
existing between state and social actors within any dynamic of development promo-
tion. The second and third parts are focused on providing the main political and 
ideological dynamics of the period so that the historical trajectory leading to the 
consolidation of the very specific developmental notions that underlined the gov-
ernmental efforts of mid-twentieth century Brazil can be unveiled. In the closing 
section we advance the lines of a prospective reflection about the ways in which 
the experiences of the 1950s impacts the country to the present day.
STATE AND SOCIETy RELATIONS WITHIN FAST-PACE  
INDUSTRIALIzATION: REVISITING THE DEBATES
The literature on the political economy of Brazilian development in the post-
war period is vast and has been constantly expanding. One of the most studied 
aspects of this phase has been the intensification of import substitution policies 
aimed at simultaneously stimulating economic growth and protecting national 
manufactures from external shocks and competition. Despite their important con-
tributions, most of these neglected to combine the political, social, ideological, and 
even idiosyncratic variables which should also be taken into consideration when 
evaluating the achievements and failures of such a process of development promo-
tion. In that context, in addition to the works cited above, see Bresser-Pereira 
(2006); Colistete (2007); Fleury and Fleury (2006); Leff (1968); Lessa (1964); Lobo 
(2009); Saad-Filho and Johnson (2005); Tyler (1976); and Welch (2006).
Akin to the experiences taking place in some other Latin American countries, 
in Brazil the post-World War II period corresponded to the transition from an 
agrarian and export oriented economy into an increasingly urbanized and indus-
trial society. Along these historical lines, the conversion to heavy industrial produc-
tion was the one of the main priorities of the political and intellectual agendas of 
the time. The Brazilian government would indeed seize the opportunity and at-
tempted to amend the country’s traditional pattern of insertion into the interna-
tional economy, as a commodity exporter. Moreover, any nationalistic goal pursued 
in the period would similarly face the structural constraints of the rising Cold War 
that consolidated the U.S. supremacy in the Western hemisphere, which required 
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special negotiation skills and a sense of political opportunism from the Brazilian 
diplomatic staff (King, 1970; Stallings, 1978; Veganzones, 1997; and Wise, 2003). 
The economic and geographical complexity of transitioning to an urban, indus-
trialized society created major challenges for providing and maintaining the neces-
sary leadership to provide minimum levels of social cohesion. As a result, the central 
government would emerge as the only political player capable of formulating and 
enacting new strategies of capital accumulation while at the same time, controlling 
the increasingly conflictive private interests being mobilized under a process of fast 
industrialization. In historical terms the national state effectively acted as the main 
agent coordinating the processes of change from a predominant rural society to the 
aspired industrialized and urbanized country.1 Finally, as will be demonstrated below, 
the transition envisaged and articulated by the national state vividly incorporated a 
developmental rhetoric — which was closely informed by foreign capital — within 
idiosyncratic public policies that reproduced, and often magnified, the social in-
equalities that permeated nation building since its foundation.
As we proceed, it is important to point out that, in our view, far from being a 
neutral entity that promotes the common good, the structures of the central state 
combined centralized and diffuse sources of authority in conformity with the fun-
damental features of political economy, becoming thus profoundly embedded in 
social relations taking place in a particular spatio-temporal context. The capitalist 
state indeed constitutes a political arena of disputes operating in a continuous 
process of formation and superseding of a contingent social equilibrium (Jessop, 
2007). In this sense, the state apparatus is both an instrument of the hegemonic 
social classes but it also maintains a partial autonomy needed to mediate class 
struggles and pursue other policies beyond the realm of the economy. Furthermore, 
the selectivity of state interventions is not given in advance but rather is the result 
of the interplay between state priorities and socio-political contestation within and 
beyond state institutions. Still, and in spite its core function as guarantor of the 
needed conditions for social cohesion and capital accumulation, the relationship 
the state established with the larger society is not purely on a repressive basis 
(Jessop, 1990, 2008). 
Instead, one the most innovative features of the capitalist state is that, at the same 
time demands consent, the state ‘educates’ the consented of the importance of consent-
ing amidst an attempt of absorbing the entire civil society (Gramsci, 1971, p. 259). 
The political and economic strategies of the state becomes, therefore, entangled in 
inter-sectoral exchanges and spatialized relations that take place under specific his-
torical configurations, as experienced in Brazil in the 1950s. Moreover, the develop-
ment of capitalist relations of production promotes also a growing internationalisa-
tion of state activities beyond the limits of its national territory (Glassman, 1999).
1 On the format of this so-called ‘state of compromise’ which would perform the role of leading the 
process of Import Substitute Industrialization in Brazil; see Ianni (1963, 1986) and especially Weffort 
(1978).
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Local dynamics remain nonetheless especially relevant to understanding the 
complexity of the relations between state and society. Particularly in the case of 
Latin America, the national state is not only described by its capitalist and political 
features but also by profoundly gendered and patriarchal relations (Cravey, 1998). 
National governments have indeed played a crucial role in articulating the interests 
of domestic groups and the demands of foreign capital while promoting fast-pace 
industrialization in post-World War II Latin America. Along these lines and on the 
basis of this brief conceptual revision, we seek to reconstruct in the next two sec-
tions the ways in which fast-paced state-led development was pursued in mid-
twentieth century Brazil. This purpose therein is to unveil the processes wherein 
specific social sectors and political forces were favoured in detriment to larger 
segments of the national population.
IMPORT-SUBSTITUTIVE INDUSTRIALIzATION AND  
THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONAL-DEVELOPMENTALISM
On January 31, 1951, after having conducted what had been until then the 
most vibrant and geographically extended presidential campaign in the history of 
the country, Getulio Vargas was, once again, Brazil’s President, in a mandate that 
would last until his suicide in August 1954. The former leader of the 1930 military 
nationalistic revolt that put in place a corporatist-like state and initiated the process 
of import-substitution industrialization was back in power poised to implement an 
ambitious agenda of economic development and social reform. The national con-
text of restored democratic rule ushered in at the onset of the World War required, 
however, a new set of political skills that the aged politician ultimately would prove 
lacking (see D’Araújo, 1982; and Fundação Getulio Vargas, 2001). Vargas’ political 
platform was largely inspired in the notion that the goal of industrialization had 
to be strengthened amidst the opportunities created by the reconfigured interna-
tional division of labour in the post-war period. This view was closely in tune with 
the framework of historical analysis formulated by the new generation of econo-
mists coalesced at the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), created 
by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1948.2
Since its inception, ECLA’s recommendations were basically informed by the 
ideas and leadership provided by its first head officer, the Argentine economist Raul 
Prebisch. Already in 1946, when serving as President of the Argentine Central Bank, 
Prebisch drew attention to the ‘peripheral’ nature of the economic insertion of Latin 
American countries in the world market. His main theoretical contribution was the 
controversial Doctrine of Unequal Exchange, which described the international 
economic system as one where the industrial centre dominates the agrarian periph-
2 The commission is nowadays described as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), with headquarters in Santiago de Chile.
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ery through a deterioration of the exchange terms that persistently prevents the 
development of the subordinated countries (Love, 1980). Along these lines, Prebisch 
argued in favour of a concerted process of industrialization to be guided by the 
national governments of the region. Such an understanding would achieve a para-
mount importance and serve as a key reference for those arguing in favour of fast-
paced industrialization in Latin America. For a revision of the synthetic works on 
the Commission, see Furtado (1985); Love (1998); and Rodrigues (1981).
Even though the World War II had initially impacted the Brazilian economy in 
a positive sense (mainly by increasing the country’s exports of food supplies), once 
the period of reconstruction in Europe began, late in the 1940s, foreign sources of 
capital were primarily targeted to the countries directly involved in the battlefronts 
and the paradigmatic example was the Marshal Plan. Similarly, the monetary sur-
plus that Brazil had gained during the years of conflict went then into a steep de-
cline, and, as a result a profound redefinition of the national economic priorities 
would become increasingly present among the country’s political and intellectual 
elites. The experiences of the war had nonetheless helped foster the goal of indus-
trialization among military leaders who, as important power brokers in the au-
thoritarian regime of New State (1937-1945), saw the need to create war-related 
(chemical and aeronautical) industries as a vital component of a policy of national 
security (Carone, 1985; Skidmore, 1967). In contrast to the restricted industrial 
policies of the war period, however, within the context of the post-war circum-
stances a new paradigm for promoting national development, which would go far 
beyond the military concerns of the previous Vargas administration, would take 
shape in Brazil. This new development approach was inspired on the notion that 
industrialization was a sine qua non condition for securing economic self-sufficien-
cy and that a more direct involvement of the national government in a variety of 
economic activities, not only the production of basic industrial goods, was needed. 
With these tenets in mind, the Brazilian government would increasingly adopt a 
more aggressive role in the promotion of heavy industrialization in the 1950s.
This broad goal was seen as attainable by resorting to governmental policies 
which sought to control import tariffs on items to be produced domestically, pro-
vide credit assistance to nationally owned industries, and artificially regulate the 
exchange rate (at the cost of rising inflation and deficits) to assure that domesti-
cally produced items, even if non-competitive, could be exported. Numerous pub-
lic utilities and state companies were created to fill gaps in productive sectors and 
infrastructure areas beyond the reach or the capability of private investors. The 
domestic market was to be favoured via periodical wage increases and by offering 
subsidized investments to consumers of public services, such as transportation, 
energy, and communication networks. At the same time, there was a controlled 
internationalisation of the economy and, since 1955 it was allowed to import ma-
chinery and equipment without exchange cover (in the form of direct foreign invest-
ment). The significant intensification of heavy industrial production in the Brazil 
throughout the 1950s is summarized in Table 1 below.
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1950 6.5 4.0 11.3 1.5 11.2
1953 2.5 (0.5) 8.7 0.2 15.3
1955 6.9 3.7 9.9 7.7 16.3
1958 7.7 4.6 16.2 2.0 11.1
1960 9.7 6.6 9.6 4.9 26.3
1964 2.9 0.0 5.2 1.3 87.3
Compiled from various sources quoted in Tyler (1976)
These figures would support the view that the 1950s in Brazil were indeed 
developmental years if considered in terms of absolute economic growth. The pe-
riod nonetheless was not only marked by fast-pace growth but also by a widespread 
developmental ideology which would be labelled as national-developmentalism and 
which exerted a profound ideational influence in mid-twentieth century in Brazil, 
particularly among intellectuals and some bureaucrats working in the governmen-
tal agencies in charge of implementing the goals of the administrations of period. 
One of the main proponents of these new economic notions supporting the goal of 
fast-paced industrialization was the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado, whose 
views argued that Latin American economies had traditionally been organized on 
the basis of a structural co-existence of stagnated productive activities (such as 
subsistence agriculture) and export-oriented, plantation-based, or mineral extrac-
tion, sectors. Based on such a diagnosis, Furtado propounded that effective na-
tional development could not occur unless efficient governmental planning in fa-
vour a new sort of involvement in the international economy (i.e., ones less 
dependent on primary-export revenues) would take place.
In Furtado’s words, 
‘[o]ur countries can no longer depend on the exporting of primary pro-
ducts to sustain their economies. The first task that we as nations must 
undertake is to reorient our investment policies towards the promotion 
of industrialization so that our commercial balance can be made even. 
Additionally, given that industrial promotion leads to gains of scale and 
technological innovation, promoting this goal should benefit our entire 
economies.’3
3 Celso Furtado, Manual of Programming and Economic Development Promotion. (Rio de Janeiro: 
Economic Commission of Latin American, 1956), chapter 1, p. 8, available at Arquivo Roberto Campos: 
R.C. e bnde 1952.09.29. e/BNDE, available at CPDOC, Getulio Vargas Foundation, in Rio de Janeiro.
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It is clear therefore that since early in the decade and progressively as the 1950s 
unfolded, ECLA’s notions were progressively turning into a common currency 
among many technocrats and decision-makers in Brazil. How these developmental 
dynamics were articulated in Brazil in the second half of the decade will occupy us 
next. This was the period when, under the stewardship of the Kubitschek adminis-
tration, the country would witness the deepening of the process of industrialization 
by making available industrialized durable and capital-goods by attracting multi-
national corporations to set shop in the country.
THE KUBITSCHEK yEARS AND THE DISPUTES AROUND  
THE CONSOLIDATION OF FAST-PACED INDUSTRIAL PROMOTION
In October 1955, Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira was elected President of 
Brazil after having run a successful campaign that promised fifty years of eco-
nomic growth and development in the five years of his presidential term. Indeed, 
the expression ‘Fifty years in Five’ was the catchphrase of the candidate’s political 
platform, and, in general lines, the defining direction of his ensuing administration. 
During the subsequent five years, Kubitschek, commonly known in Brazil simply 
as JK, would lead a series of state reforms that, by extending Vargas’ policies, aimed 
at implementing an ambitious plan of economic growth centred on industrial pro-
motion as the basis of an alliance between government and private interests. A clear 
indication of his developmental agenda, in his first day in office Kubitschek cre-
ated the Council of Development, an autonomous bureaucratic agency devised to 
coordinate the implementation of the economic projects of the administration.4
The plan would receive the appellation of Targets Plan, given its list of thirty 
priority targets for the national economy that should receive preferential treatment 
on the part of the Federal administration.5 During the implementation of the Plan 
(1956-1961), 350 billion cruzeiros were invested in multiple sectors of the economy, 
which demonstrated the commitment of JK’s administration with the goals of 
 national-developmentalism. Insofar as the Plan’s impacts in the country’s produc-
tive structure, during the JK administration important sectors of the Brazilian 
economy, such as energy production, transportation networks, and the durable 
goods industry, would all be significantly expanded. To better illustrate this point 
it is important to state that in 1953 the proportion of traditional consumer goods 
in the total value of manufacturing output was 58.6% (with capital goods repre-
4 Presidential Decree, number 38.744, of February 1, 1956, creating the Development Council, in Fun-
do Conselho do Desenvolvimento. 1Q, SDE, Box 3130. Arquivo Nacional. Rio de Janeiro.
5 The Plan was divided into five main areas of the national economy which should be favored during 
the five-year presidential term for receiving priority targeted investments. These included energy supply, 
transportation networks, basic industries, agricultural production, and technical training and education. 
For a synthetic list of economic projects or targets contained in the Targets Plan, see Faro and Silva 
(1991); Lafer (2002); and Lessa (1964).
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senting the rate of 5.4%), whereas in 1958 this proportion had shrank to 52.6% 
(whilst capital goods had increased to 12.3%), according to various sources quot-
ed in Tyler (1976). If this new industrial phase partially derived from the larger 
availability of private international capital, the main reason for the fast-paced in-
dustrial growth was the purposeful effort on the part of the Brazilian Federal 
Government.6
Much of these economic achievements depended on the existence of a new 
conception about development promotion within the Brazilian bureaucracy which 
benefited from a growing number of centres of excellence in training and research 
previously established by President Vargas. While Vargas and his economic advisers 
believed that state-owned companies should be created in order for industrial 
growth to take place during his second term in office (1951-54), his market-orient-
ed political opponents propounded the need for lower import tariffs on industrial-
ized goods and better conditions for attracting private foreign investors. These 
different views on what national development should mean fostered a rich ideo-
logical debate among socio-political segments in the subsequent administration of 
Kubitschek (1956-1961) and the President himself would fluctuate between paying 
lip-service to ECLA’s autonomist developmental notions and support a path of 
economic promotion largely structured on the basis of opening the national econ-
omy to foreign multinational interests.
In the first front, Kubitschek even helped disseminate and consolidate some of 
ECLA’s core notions early in his administration. In fact, in his very first Message 
to the National Congress, in February 1956, for instance, JK expressed his concur-
rence with the notion of a progressive deterioration in the international terms of 
trade for primary products (Oliveira, 1956, p. 14). Similarly, during his national 
campaign, the future president had already stated that:
‘[t]he world today is divided between countries that are part of the in-
dustrial age and those that continue to be exporters of primary produces 
and importers industrial goods. (…) Given that the prices of the former 
are increasingly lower than the prices of the latter, there is a persistent 
tendency towards unbalanced current accounts that can only be resolved 
by a steadfastness action on the part of the Federal State in promoting a 
national project of industrialization’. (Oliveira, 1955, p. 32)
These pronouncement notwithstanding, and even though he was a charis-
matic politician who believed in the need for fast-paced economic growth for all 
sectors of society, Kubitschek would constantly rely on more market-oriented tech-
nocrats for the execution of his developmental agenda. Namely, and as will detailed 
6 Largely due to the economic assistance provided by the United States and the multilateral financial 
institutions set up after the World War II, Western Europe and Japan were able to restructured their 
economies within the first 10 years after the conflict, and by the second half of the 1950s were, once 
again, seeking for investment opportunities in Asia, Europe, and in Latin America.
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below, JK’s long-time economic adviser Lucas Lopes and the career diplomat 
Roberto Campos were behind the formulation and execution of the Targets Plan 
when they headed the two main governmental agencies in charge of the adminis-
tration’s growth promotion goals: The Council of Development and the National 
Bank of Economic Development. As indicated earlier, while largely inspired on 
security concerns (i.e., social stability) in tune with Cold War dynamics of the 
time, Kubitschek’s goals nonetheless reverberated well among nationalist intel-
lectuals gathered around the state-funded Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies 
(ISEB) who argued in favour of a much more ambitious and socially inclusive 
view of development. 
Created in 1955 as an official agency of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, the Institute nonetheless was largely autonomous to pursue its own course 
of intellectual formulations, increasingly more nationalistic and socially oriented 
as the decade progressed. ISEB members strongly believed that development and 
nationalism were intrinsically related and, therefore, had to be articulated in tan-
dem should, what they defined as, the ‘condition of underdevelopment’ the coun-
try faced were to be surpassed. Moreover, these intellectuals favoured a much more 
autonomous and nationalist path of industrialization. Similarly, ISEB ideologues, 
such as Roland Corbisier, Cândido Mendes de Almeida, Alvaro Vieira Pinto, 
Guerreiro Ramos, and even the more moderate Hélio Jaguaribe, all consistently 
argued that the Brazilian government should seek a more independent path of 
economic insertion in the international economy, if possible by subscribing to the 
main principles enunciated at the Bandung Conference (e.g., non-intervention, 
equitable terms of trade, and multilateral support for the process of industrializa-
tion), which were all seen as the most efficient way to promote national develop-
ment in agriculture-based economies (Almeida, 1963; Corbisier, 1959, Jaguaribe, 
1953, 1954; Pinto, 1960; and Ramos, 1958).
In direct opposition to the core statist developmental views espoused by most 
members of ISEB, Kubitschek consistently defended the view that the measure for 
attesting the existence of national development did not rest only on claims for 
political autonomy or on demands for social inclusion but rather on the govern-
mental capacity of preventing social disruption caused by poor economic growth. 
This point is well illustrated in a speech JK pronounced at the Inaugural Lecture 
for the academic activities of ISEB in 1956, when he declared that:
‘[w]e are true nationalists not because we are xenophobic but because 
we search national solutions for our problems. We welcome and request 
support to our efforts coming from abroad, such as investment capital, 
equipments and technical assistance (…) [which] are not the factors that 
maintain us in our underdeveloped state, which is rather caused precisely 
by the absence of foreign productive investments’ (Oliveira, 1958, p. 48).
Along very similar lines, and clearly exemplifying Kubitschek’s complex set of 
influences, one of the leading figures in the formulation and implementation of the 
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Targets Plan, the future Brazilian ambassador to the United States, Roberto Campos 
— who held leading post at the National Bank of Development and at the Council 
of Development during JK’s mandate — believed that the reasons for the eco-
nomic underdevelopment of the country rested mainly in the absence of investment 
capital and the low purchasing power of its population. In his view, what was 
primarily required for economic development to take place was attracting large 
sums of foreign investment to selected economic projects (Campos, 1956, p. 232). 
Campos also argued against the notion that the Federal government should 
seek to attend basic social needs of the population by becoming the main pro-
moter of economic development via excessive public expenditures. In his own 
words, ‘the option of development requires above all the acceptance by everyone 
that fast economic growth, not socially oriented disbursement, is the main task at 
hand and the only way to reduce social economic inequalities.’7 Moreover, the 
market-oriented Campos disagreed with ISEB’s standpoints and repeatedly warned 
that the goal of industrialization should not be promoted at the cost of inflation 
(i.e., at the expense of public funds). As he put it, 
‘[n]o one can contest the gains poor countries received from the process 
of industrialization. This is indeed a vital element of political stability in 
developing countries. This goal must be promoted even if protectionist 
measures have to be adopted. However, no one should believe that social 
upward mobility for all social segments is an immediate outcome of such 
undertaking nor that inflationary growth can improve the conditions of 
living in the long run.’8
Analogous claims were uttered by Lucas Lopes, the main formulator and first 
coordinator of the implementation of the Targets Plan. In concrete terms, in a speech 
pronounced at a welcoming reception for the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, in 1958, when serving as Minister of the Economy, Lopes declared that Brazil 
represented the best place for U.S. investments the region. In his view, Brazil could 
resolve its internal social ills, which represented welcoming grounds for foreign 
ideologies, only if private sources of capitals were favoured within an attractive 
framework for foreign investors.9 Lopes indeed believed that the main task that the 
administration should take upon was controlling inflationary spending and target-
ing public investments exclusively into what was perceived as the main economic 
bottlenecks or infrastructure hurdles that prevented the achievement of higher eco-
7 Speech Pronounced at ISEB’s Inaugural Lecture on December 21 1955, p. 51, in Fundo Roberto 
Campos: RC.e.bnde.1955.06.30, available at CPDOC, Getúlio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro.
8 Campos’ Lecture at the University of Arizona in 1960, in Fundo Roberto Campos: RC.e.ag.1955.05.02, 
available at CPDOC, Getulio Vargas Foundation, in Rio de Janeiro.
9 Fundo Lucas Lopes: LL pi Lopes, L 1958.08.06, available at CPDOC, Getulio Vargas Foundation, in 
Rio de Janeiro.
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nomic rates of growth.10 Later the same year Lopes went to New york University 
where he lectured on the relations between Brazil and the United States. On that 
occasion he expressed an optimistic reading of the Brazilian economy and stressed 
his choice in favour of a market-based path of development for the country. Lopes 
similarly voiced the position that controlling the rising popular demands (e.g., for 
salary increases) should be an urgent political task given that these would pressure 
public expenditures and cause inflation to rise, thus jeopardizing, in this view, the 
entire developmental initiatives undertaken by the administration.11
Taken together these notions illustrate well the commitments of the federal 
administration in pursuing a market-oriented path of fast economic growth instead 
of a more inclusive project of national development. It is not surprising therefore 
that, despite the existence of alternative views on national development, the main 
political operators in the administration would favour private economic agents and 
fiscal responsibility instead of job creation and a more autonomous developmental 
course. In fact, one of the most important achievements of the JK years — and one 
praised largely in the literature on the developmental period in Brazil — was that 
of attracting multinational auto-making corporations to set shop in the country. 
And while important in deepening the process of industrialization, these companies 
did not however provide sufficient jobs for the growing masses of migrants moving 
to the urban centres in the period, nor did they provide, in the long run, manufac-
tured competitive products given their assured market-share (Baer, 1965; Gordon 
and Grommers, 1960; and Latini, 1984).
WHAT DEVELOPMENT? CLASS STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE  
OF THE STATE IN DEVELOPMENT PROMOTION 
In a general sense the Brazilian society in the 1950s was still profoundly char-
acterized by the same sociological elements of the long durée that characterized the 
organization of the country since colonial times, such as the inequalities between 
city and countryside, the hierarchical and centralized society, and the territorial 
expansion of the economy continuously engulfing the perceived abundance of 
natural resources. It was against this background that, because of a favourable 
national and international conjuncture, the adoption of economic strategies based 
on the steel industry and urban expansion starting in the 1940s would be made 
possible. 
In concrete terms, the national state through its more qualified agencies played 
a central role in the comprehensive process of economic transformation the coun-
10 Speech Pronounced at the Annual Meeting of the World Bank in May 1958, in Fundo Lucas Lopes: 
LL Lopes, L 1958.00.00, available at CPDOC, Getulio Vargas Foundation, in Rio de Janeiro.
11 Fundo Lucas Lopes: LL pi Lopes, L 1958.12.01, available at CPDOC, Getúlio Vargas Foundation in 
Rio de Janeiro.
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try witnessed in the second half of the 20th-century. In fact, resorting to a combina-
tion of repression, persuasion, and paternalism, the national state took a signifi-
cantly political and economic responsibility in the social, material and symbolic 
modernization of many sectors of the national Brazilian society. Internal disputes 
within the intellectual and economic elite revealed the politicised nature of state 
intervention, to the extent that the benefits were highly unevenly distributed across 
society and geographical locations. Moreover, the controversies and hesitations that 
characterized the 1950s in Brazil provided invaluable opportunities for the stronger 
groups of interest to capture the functioning of public agencies according to their 
particular demands. These intense and highly contradictory dynamics were only 
momentarily contained by the charismatic influence of two gifted political leaders: 
Vargas and Kubitschek (Weyland, 1998). 
Of special importance, the JK administration in the second half of the decade 
transcended its immediate historical moment and the material achievements of his 
term of office. This may help explain the mystique surrounding the so-called 
‘Kubistchek years’ which still serves as an evocative example of the successful ar-
ticulation between an appealing personal leader and distinct economic and political 
achievements. Likewise, if the structure of the state was only partially transformed 
by this visionary leader, the symbolism of the JK administration certainly repre-
sented a phase of intense activity and creative innovation previously unseen in the 
Brazilian history.12 
Still, ideological debates regarding the best course of action towards develop-
ment in the period were clearly demonstrated in the exchanges between organiza-
tions such as ECLA and ISEB and the ideas espoused by the Council of Development 
and the National Bank of Economic Development. Indeed, despite the great influ-
ence of liberal technocrats, such as Campos and Lopes, it is important to point out 
that the JK years ultimately corresponded to an idiosyncratic, and highly incom-
plete, Keynesian-reform of the Brazilian state. Notwithstanding the liberal conces-
sions, most strategies and institutional adjustments tried to alleviate uneven geo-
graphical development within the national space-economy and promote a stable 
industrialization (Brenner, 2004, p. 130). 
The conditions that emerged in the aftermath of World War II, together with 
the demands of the geopolitics of the Cold War, paved the road for public policies 
that more candidly supported import substitution industrialization — already ad-
opted since the end of the nineteenth-century and, more significantly, during the 
World War I. Similarly, the intense restructuring of state-society relations in the 
period had also to allow some limited concessions to the working classes, as well 
as some cohabitation with the demands of rural oligarchy. Moreover, the opportu-
nities created by this peculiar path of development had to be adapted to the unique 
12 Or, at least, that was the image that Kubitschek and his supporting group tried to convey with some 
success, given that all democratically elected presidents in Brazil since the end of the military regime 
that lasted between 1964 and 1985 have tried to be associated with the image of JK.
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circumstances of a country experiencing a fast transition from agrarian to urban 
society without ever conceding to the more ambitious agenda of social and politi-
cal reforms. 
CONCLUSIONS
Considering what has been presented it could be stated that, at least in a gen-
eral sense, the 1950s in Brazil were marked by a search for national development 
which favoured fast-paced rather than targeted policies aimed at promoting social 
inclusion and overcoming the poverty that plagued much of the nation. Still, it is 
interesting to point out that Kubitschek’s calls for rapid development and affirma-
tion of national sovereignty capture the public imaginary, even of the lower social 
strata that benefited less than the middle classes in the period. Indeed, JK’s main 
policies were centred on responding to the crisis of a subordinate industrialization 
by straightening the internal accumulation of capital and helping the penetration 
of the national industry by multinational conglomerates, particularly in the auto-
mobile sector. The government’s position on development promotion was not, how-
ever, equally shared by the different groups of the Brazilian society. 
In fact, whereas the main agencies in charge of implementing the Targets Plan 
sought out to implement an ambitious program of economic reforms that deepened 
the links between domestic production lines and the rapidly expanding interna-
tional capitalist market; nationalistic intellectuals increasingly argued that promot-
ing national development required decreasing the interconnections between the 
Brazilian economy and foreign economic interests. Moreover, even if the Kubitschek 
administration was able to restrain the class conflicts of his time, in the sense that 
reduced the tension and postponed the looming military coup that would finally 
take place in 1964, his government was nonetheless affected by its own inconsisten-
cies and the structural contradictions of a dependent capitalist economy.
Perhaps the fate of Brasília epitomizes the shift from an optimistic 1950s to 
the sombre dictatorial years of the 1960s and 70s. Indeed, the modernist capital 
designed under the egalitarian inspiration of Lucio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer 
would subsequently come to represent an authoritarian and inflexible urbanism 
that proves so alienating to most of its own residents (Williams, 2005). These con-
tradictions continue to haunt Brazilian society and the achievements of national 
development policies to this day, which only reinforce the relevance of excavating 
the origin and the legacy of national-developmentalism.
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